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The Bhopal settlement order: Social activism in
connict with judicial activism?
IlP

SRIVASTAVA

The Supreme Court of India on February 14,1989 passed the follovv'ing order in
the Vllioll Carbide Co'])oratio/l case :1
"(I)

The Union Carhide Corporation shall pay a sum of U.S. Dollars -i70
millions (Four hundred se\'enty millions) to the Union of India in full
settlement of all claims, rights and liabilities related to and arising out of
the Bhopal gas disaster.

(2) The aforesaid sum shall be paid by the Union Carbide Corp,)ration
Union of India on or before March 31, 1989.

to the

(3) To enable the effectuation of the settlement all civil proceedings

related tu
and arising out of the Bhopal gas disaster shall hereby stand transferred to
this court and shall stand concluded in terms of the settlement. and all
criminal proceedings related to and arising out of the disaster shall stand
quashed wherever these may be pending,"

On a memorandum, relating to the overall settlement, ha\'ing been filed by the two
main parties to the case, another order was passed on February 15, 19S9 in the nature
of consequential directions providing for the modalities for payment of the settlement.
etc.2

\Vhile the settlement order was welcomed by the pragmatists who w..:rc
genuinely conc..:rncd with 'the enormity of human suffering occasioned by the Bhopal
gas disaster and the pressing urgency to pro\ide immediate and substantial relief to
victims of the disaster"3, it also emked widespread protest from others, in particular,
the social act ion groups and other social act i\ists. They not only criticised the ord..:r
but even politicised it. Their prot..:st went to the extent of denigrating the hishcst
court of the land and even ridiculing the hon'bIe judges who constituted the Bench.
It appeared that most of the protesters and the critics wnsidered the unfortun:lll..'
\ictims of the gas tragedy as 'guinea pigs' for testing a legal experiment in fi~hting the
multinational syndrome, most of them. s,uffcr from. They forgot the humane angle of
the issue which required immediate adequate financial relief to the p\)"r \ictim~,
1.
2.

3.

Union Cn!"de C"'l'(II-.uioll \'. [;nioll of Indw t I')!"}) I see 6i~ (Bcfl'rc R'i. Palhdh.
Vcn"alJral11;.th. R'"1;;Clnath \Iisra. \IS. Vcnkatach,t1iah dnJ " D. O;ha. JJ.1
Ibid. p. 6 ~(" ()~7.
Ibid. p. 6~5.
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The Supreme Court, as stated earlier, rose to the occasion. It considered the
settlement arrived at, although inappropriately put as an order of the court, between
the Union Carbide and the victims represented exclusively by the Government of
India, as the best under the circumstances. It was apparently more concerned and
rightly so, .to alleviate the sufferings of the still surviving victims and those of the
starving left-behind dependents of the dead ones, rather than leave them to their fate,
destitution and an uncertain outcome of a prolonged legal battle.
Since the case is again before the court in one form or the other, it would not be
proper to write a comment on the case as a whole at this stage. Moreover much has
already been written on the aspect of expediency and adequacy of compensation by
. eminent scholars in support of the settlement. However, I will deal with some other
issues which have been raised and also with some general issues which are in the
nature of bye-products of over-judicial activism, culminating in the unwholesome
protest against such a reasonably fair decision.
Some scholars feel that the settlement compensation principle, if any, and the
settlement amount are in direct conflict with the principles laid down in the Shriram
Fertiliser case.4 The ratio in that 'farewell judgment' of Justice Bhagwati, the former
Chief Justice, is controversial. In my view, the ratio, if any, of the case is that the
Supreme Court, while acting under Article 32 of the Constitution, can in appropriate
cases, award compensation provided the respondent was a 'State' within the meaning
of Article 12 of the Constitution. All other observations, relating to 'Absolute liability'
and more than that one relating to the measure of compensation which the hon'ble
judge stated to be of according to the magnitude and paying capacity of the
enterprise, are, at best, only obiter. It is worthwhile to reproduce what he said:
"We would therefore hold that where an enterprise is engaged in a hazardous or
inherently dangerous activity and harm results to anyone on account of an
accident in the operation of such hazardous or inherently dangerous activity
resulting, for example, in escape of toxic gas the enterprise is strictly and
absolutely liable to compensate all those who are affected by the accident and
such liability is not subject to any of the exceptions which operate vis-a-vis the
tortious principle of strict liability under the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher.s
We would also like to point out that the measure of compensation in the kind of
cases referred to in the preceding paragraph must be correlated to the magnitude
and capacity of the enterprise because such compensation must have deterrent
effect. The larger and more prosperous the enterprise the greater must be the
amount of compensation payable by it for the harm caused on account of an
accident in the carrying on of the hazardous or inherently dangerous activity of
the enterprise."6
On the face of it, the observation runs counter to the theory that "arbitrariness is the
antithesis of equality", which Justice Bhagwati himself so zealously propounded in
4.

M.C. Melita v. Union of India (1987) 1 see 395.

5.

(1868)LR 3 HL 330.

6.

(1987) 1 see 395, 421.
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Maneka Gandlti v. Union of India.7 There he said:
"...
We must reiterate here what was pointed out by the majority in E.P.
Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadus, namely, that 'from a positivistic point equality
is antithetic to. arbitrariness.ln
fact equality and arbitrariness are sworn enemies;
one belongs to the rule of law in a republic, while the other, to the whim and
caprice of an absolute monarch. Where an act is arbitrary, it is implicit in it that
it is unequal both according to political logic and constitutional law and is
therefore violative of Article 14. Article 14 strikes at arbitrariness in state action
and ensures fairness and equality of treatment. The principle of reasonableness,
which legally. as well as philosophically, is an essential element of equality or
non-arbitrariness pervades Article 14 like a brooding omnipresence .. .'i9
I think it does not need much of an argument to establish that both the principle
of absolute liability and more than that the principle for the measure of compensation
·as expounded by Justice Bhagwati have germs of arbitrariness,
unfairness and
inequality. It would be in fitness of things that at the very first opportunity, a larger
bench of the court should disapprove this part of the judgment in the Shriram
Fertiliser case so that' the lower courts should not feel bound by this obiter dicta of the
apex court. This part is obiter because the main issue before the court was whether
the Supreme Court while acting under Article 32 could award compensation as relief
against Shriram Fertiliser Ltd. The court held that it could, but declined to award the
same as it could not decide that Shriram Fertiliser Ltd. was a 'State' within the
meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution.10 The case should have ended there but the
Court went on expounding the principle of absolute liability and the yardstick for the
measure of compensation which, as stated earlier, cannot be treated as the 'ratio' of
the case.
The jurisdictional basis of the Supreme Court in passing the settlement order
has also been questioned by almost all the critics. How paradoxical that such a
criticism comes from those very persons who have been the active supporters of the
activist judges of the Supreme Court in assuming for the court unlimited
jurisdiction/power
through the strategy of SAL/PIL (Sodal Action Litigation/Public
.
Interest Litigation) cases. Except perhaps for theA. R. Alltulay casell the end-product
of most of the Public Interest Litigation cases,12 coincided with the concept of social
justice of the Social Action Litigation groups, who applauded those decisions. They
did not then bother about the jurisdictional basis or constitutional propriety of the
Supreme Court's approach in those cases. With the passage of time, the doubtful and
at times even .the exercise of power outside the constitutional framework, acquired
legitimacy and gradually the Supreme Court transformed
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

itself from a 'constitutional

(1978) 2 seR 621.
(1974) 2 SeR 348.
(1978) 2 seR 621, 674.
(1987) 1 see 395.
A.R Antulay v. RS. Nayak AIR 1988 se 1531.•
Bandhua Mulai Morcha v. Union of India (1984) 3 see 161 ; PUDR v. Union of India (1982) 3 see
235; All M.C. Mehta cases in particular, The Kanpur Tanneries case (1987) 4 see 463; Olga Tellis v.
Municipal Corporation,Bombay (1985) 3 see 545; R.L.& E ..Kendra v. U.P.AIR 1985 se 1259, etc.
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court' into a 'court of unlimited powers'. The soundness of the aforesaid assessment
one can appreciate if he/she goes through the judgment of CJ. Bhagwati (as he then
was) in the Shriram Ferliliser casel3 and the majority judgment in A.R. Antulay case. I.
While discussing the scope of Article 32, Justice Bhagwati said:
"It may now be taken as well settled that Article 32 does not merely confer
power on this court to issue a direction, order or writ for enforcement of the
fundamental rights but it also lays a constitutional obligation on this court to
protect the fundamental rights of the people and for that purpose this court has
all incidental and ancillary powers including the power to forge new remedies
and fashion new strategies designed to enforce the fundamental rights ... The
power of the court is not only injunctive in ambit, that is, preventing the
infringement of a fundamental right, but it is also remedial in scope and provides
relief against a breach of the fundamental right already committed ... We must,
therefore, hold that Article 32 is not powerless to assist a person when he finds
that his fundamental right has been violated. He can in that event seek remedial
assistance under Article 32. The power of the court to grant such remedial relief
may include the power to award compensation in appropriate case ... ,,15
Justice Bhagwati, as stated earlier, then goes on expounding the theory of
'absolute liability' and the principle of measure of compensation, based not upon the
suffering or injury caused but upon the magnitude and paying capacity of the
enterprise concerned.16 In A.R. Antulay case, a seven judges bench, by majority, laid
down a new jurisprudence of 'inherent jurisdiction/power'
outside the constitutional
framework, under which the Supreme Court can reverse/set aside the decision of the
Supreme Court itself in the same case. Armed with the new jurisprudence of absolute
powers, the cdurt ventured to amend even the basic structure of the constitutidn. In
P.N. Kumar v, Municipal Corporation, Delhi17 and Kanubhai Brahmbhatt v. State of
Gujaratl8 the court declined to entertain petition under Article 32 and instead directed
the petitioners to have recourse to Article 226. The right to move the Supreme Court
under Article 32 has been recognised as most fundamental of the fundamental
rights.19 Under the principles of the Kesavananda Bharati case,w Article 32 forms the
basic structure of the Constitution and if Parliament had amended the Article the way
it has been done by the two division benches of the Supreme Court, I am sure the
Supreme Court would have struck down the amendment as violative of the basic
structure of the Constitution.
I

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

M.c.MeJua

v. Union of India (1987) 1 SCC 395.
AIR 1988 SC 1531.
(1987) 1 SCC 395, 407, 408.
(1987) 1 SCC 395.
(1987) 4 SCC 609.
AIR 1987 SC 1159.

19.

"If I was asked to name any particular article in the Constitution as the most important - an
article without which this Constitution would be a nullity - I would hot refer to any other article
except this one. It is the very soul of the Constitution and the very heart of it." Dr. B.R. Ambedkar,
CAD. Vol VII, pp 950-3. Romeslz Tlzapper v. Stale of Madras AIR 1950 SC 124; Prem Clzand Garg

20.

AIR 1973 SC 1461.

v. Excise Commissioner,

AIR 1963 SC 996.
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Above are just a few illustrative instances which substantiate the assertion about
the new tendency towards absolutism of judicial power, to which the Social Action
Litigation groups contributed a great deal. The doctrine of precedent, the principle of
fmality of action and certainty of law and even the golden rule of judicial self-restraint
have become out' of fashion. If the present trend continues the law students of the
future years will study them only as part of legal history.
A disturbing off-shoot of Social Action Litigation/Public
Interest Litigation
cases, is the acquisition by the Social Action Litigation groups and other social
activists an attitude of militancy vis-a-vis the judicial process. Sheela Barse v. Union of
India 21 is a pointer to this tendency. Further, the court did not realise when it started
liberalisation, rather over-liberalisation, of the 'locus standi' rule, that these groups
will gradually assume the roles of both 'the petitioner and the judge' prepared to pick
up the gun against. the court. once a judgment goes against their way of thinking. That
exactly is what happened. In the U.C.c. Settlement Order, the end-product was not to
the liking of the social activists, who are up in arms against the court. Apart from
demonstrations, rallies and sweeping the stairs and verandahs of the Supreme Court
complex symbolising a cleansing process, they are now questioning the jurisdictional
basis of passing the order.
Notwithstanding my concern regarding the assumption by the Supreme Court of
absolute power both within and beyond the constitutional framework, in the Union
Carbide case, in my view, the court did work out the Settlement Order within the
constitutional framework of its jurisdiction. The case was before the court in the
normal course under its appellate jurisdiction - appeal against the interim order
passed by the High Court. The Supreme Court exercised its inherent powers ancillary to its appellate jurisdiction to do justice in the case. That such an inherent
power does exist had the unanimous approval of all the seven judges in the A.R.
Antulay case. Justice Venkatachaliah, one of the dissenting judges, said: "Inherent
powers do not confer, or constitute a source of jurisdiction. They are to be exercised
in aid of jurisdiction that is already invested.22 The only vulnerable part of the
procedural aspect of the order is that the order precedes the settlement between the
parties which gives an impression that the settlement was ordered by the court. But if
one looks at the whole sequence of events, it becomes clear that the settlement order
was passed after full discussion with the parties concerned during which the parties
might have, on the suggestion of the court, come to such a settlement orally. Further,
it is quite possible that because of the very sensitive nature of the issues involved in
relation to the settlement, the court passed the order on the basis of the overall
discussion which had already taken place before it was publicised and the social action
groups adopted obstructionist methods to obstruct the due course of justice. Later
events justify such an apprehension, if any, entertained by the court. The court very
appropriately did not encourage the interveners to thwart the course of settlement in
the name of social justice ...
Under the circumstances, no valid objection can be
raised to the passing of the settlement order. Nor objection can be taken to the
21.
22.

(1988) 4 see 226.
AIR 1988 se 1531.
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consequential orders, granting, in substance, absolute immunity to Union Carbide
Corporation from all civil and criminal liabilities arising out of the gas tragedy which
formed part of the overall settlement. Even otherwise, the consequential orders may
be deemed to have been passed to do complete justice in the case. Article 142 of the
Constitution does confer such a power on the Supreme Court.Z3
The Government of India has been attacked for conferring upon itself almost
exclusive right to represent the Bhopal gas victims. The law is already under challenge
and any comment on the issue of its validity will not be appropriate.24 But I take the
position that even if the Act is declared void, it does not render the Settlement Order
invalid. In this eventuality, the Government of India must be deemed to have
represented the victims as their 'next friend' acting pro bono publico. After all Social
Action Litigation/Public Interest Litigation is not the sole monopoly of the social
activists. The Government of India, which consist of elected representatives of the
people, has a pre-emptive right to represent its people against third parties, sp~cially
when the third party is foreign based. Their pro bono publico is not likely to ~
doubted. They will fight the case not against capitalism or marxism, nor against
multinationals, not even for just principles. They will fight for the victim. In this case
the Gov~rnment, as the next friend of the victims, have just done this.
Before I close, I would like to make a few submissions for the consideration of
the apex court. The court, I think, has reached the end of the road in so far as judicial
activism and Social Action Litigation/Public Interest Litigation cases are concerned.
If it wants to save the institution against the type of assaults which have been made on
it, if it wants to resurrect itself and bring back the glory it once enjoyed - it has to
apply the back-gear. Over-liberalisation of the locus standi rule and over-judicial
activism, both have become counter-productive.
It should restrict Public Interest Litigation to rare situations and to well-meaning
persons or groups who will not insist on playing both the petitioner and the judge and
whose primary rather the only concern be the interest of the victim.
As regards judicial activism, I am reminded of the exhortation made by Justice
Patanjali Shastri as early as 1952.Dealing with the nature of the powers of the Supreme
Court, he observed that the limit to their exercise of power 'can only be dictated by
their sense of responsibility and self-restraint and the sobering reflection that the
Constitution is meant not only for people of their way of thinking but for all .. .'2S
The court has been paying lip service to the two basic conditions for invoking
Article 32. The conditions are: (1) violation or threatened violation of a Fundamental
Right; and (2) the alleged violator being the 'State' as defined in Article 12. Justice
Bhagwati, who is recognised as the pioneer of judicial activism in this country and
certainly the most activist of the activist judges of the Supreme Court could never
shake off the pretention of working within the constitutional framework and abiding
23.
24.
25.

Article 142(1) : 'The Supreme Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction may pass such decree or make
such order asis necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or matter pending before it. . .'
The Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster (Processing of Claims) Act. 1985.
State of Madras v. V.C.Rol\"AIR 1952 SC 196.
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by the two conditions. It was a different matter that he would go to the extent of overstretching the scope of Articles 14 and 21 to bring within their reach violation of any
human right and at the same time expanding even, beyond recognition, the meaning
of 'other authorities' in Article 12 to cover any instrumentality,
institution- or
organisation within its ambit. In the Shriram Ferliliser case, he declined Lo award
compensation under Article 32 as he could not finaIly decide that Mis Shrirarn
Fertiliser Ltd. feIl within the concept 'other authorities' under Article 12 of the
Constitution.
But now even pretentions
of working within the constitutional
framework have been given up. In the Kallpur Tanlleries case the Supreme Court
while acting under Article 32 of the Constitutron, issued injunctive closure orders to
private tanneries. The end-product of the case was certainly good one - aimed at
prevention of poIlution of Ganges. But the court could have produced the same endproduct by foIlowing the Constitutional path. It could have directed the PoIlution
Control Board or the Government to enforce the provisions of relevant Acts.26 Of
late, Article 12 is being distorted to the extent of bringing in the institution of judiciary
including the Supreme Court within the concept of 'State'. In A.R. Alltlllay case, 'it has
almost done so when it took the view that the Constitution Bench order violated
Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution.27 These rights are guaranteed only against State
action and the word 'State' is defined in Article 12. By no stretch of interpretation the
Supreme Court, while performing judicial function, can be deemed as "Government
and Parliament of India and the Government and the Legislature of each of the States
and all local or other authorities ... under (he control of the Government of India:'
But the court did implicitly hold that the Supreme Court was 'State'; otherwise how its
judicial order violated Articles 14 and 21. Who can challenge the verdict of the apex
court? One consequence of this distortion is that it also becomes 'State' for the
purposes of Part IV of the Constitution.211 The concentration of all powers in one
institution will disturb the tripartite system of government which works on the
principles of checks and balances. Whether anyone takes a serious note of such an
aberration or not, it will certainly make 'Montesquieu" turn in his grave.
Judicial restraint is all the more required when it seeks to reverse/set aside its
own judgment in the same case. Article 137 is there for correcting an error in its
decision. There is no other way - appellate, Article 32 or general inherent
jurisdiction. Let the apex court not re-enact A.R. AntI/lays anymore. Sooner it is overruled, better it is towards restoring the concept of finality of action and thereby
respect for law. This then, in the words of Justice Venkatachaliah, would be both
'good sense and good law'.

* * * *

26.

Water Act. 1974 and Environment

27.

AIR 1988 SC 1531.

Protection

Act. 1986.

28.

Part IV deals with Directive Principles of State Policy:
Article 37: Definitions.In this part. unless the context
same meaning as in Part III.

otherwise

requires.

"the Stal¢." has the

